Is it too soon to revisit the Fed’s 2020 monetary policy framework? No!

 

On August 27, 2020, the FOMC released a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. This document laid out the goals for monetary policy, articulated the policy framework, and was designed to serve as the foundation for the Committee's policy actions. The statement indicated that the FOMC intends to conduct a regular review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices roughly every five years.

That means that the next review may take place in 2025, and, if the past review is a guide, the Fed will launch the review in early 2024 as it prepares the groundwork for (possibly) revising its policy framework. It is time to start that review now.

Outside the Fed, the review has already started. The Brookings Institution, on May 23, 2023, hosted a conference titled “The Fed: Lessons learned from the past three years.” Gauti Eggertsson and Don Kohn discussed how the FOMC’s 2020 policy framework may have contributed to its delay in responding to the surge in inflation experienced in 2021, while a panel consisting of Ben Bernanke, Olivier Blanchard, Rich Clarida, Kristen Forbes, and Ellen Meade discussed potential reforms of the FOMC’s policy framework.

With hindsight, the 2020 review resulted in a policy framework that was designed, quite clearly, to fight the last monetary policy war, the battle against an inflation rate that was systematically too low in an environment of low interest rates. It was ill-suited for the current environment of high inflation. The next policy framework needs to be robust, not tailored to one set of circumstances that could quickly change.

At its core, any monetary policy framework needs to ensure inflation remains low and stable, promote financial stability, and make certain the central bank has the flexibility to respond in the face of shocks to the macro economy. It should also facilitate the central bank’s ability to clearly communicate policy to the public.

The shift in 2020 from inflation targeting to a form of average inflation targeting (AIT) meant the Fed’s inflation goal became ill-defined and, therefore, less transparent. At the Brookings event, Kristen Forbes and Rich Clarida both noted that a target range for inflation should be given serious consideration. A range would be easy for the public to understand, while avoiding the specious appearance that the Fed can preciously control inflation.

A new statement on goals and strategy must also address the “maximum employment” part of the Fed’s Congressional mandate. This part of the dual mandate has always been harder to translate into a specific measurable objective. If the FOMC wishes to maintain its asymmetric “shortfalls of employment” language, it needs to explain more clearly the basis on which it will judge whether the economy is short of its maximum employment or not. Unemployment rates that are at historically low levels as seen recently do not require a monetary policy response when inflation forecasts remain consistent with inflation goals. However, the Fed’s poor ability to forecast inflation makes such a strategy problematic.

Besides reviewing its policy strategy, the FOMC should examine its tactics. In 2021 it argued the shocks to inflation were temporary, justifying its failure to react. However, as I discussed in "Implications of a Changing Economic Structure for the Strategy of Monetary Policy", a paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 2003 Jackson Hole Symposium, better outcomes can be achieved by acting as if inflation shocks will not be temporary. When faced with uncertainty about the persistence of exogenous shocks, it is better to over-estimate the shock’s persistence, not underestimate if as the FOMC did, as it was consistently surprised when shocks failed to fade away. In that same paper, I showed that a central bank seeking a policy that is robust to uncertainty about shock persistence should act as if the shock will be more persistent than it really believes. That is, even if the policymaker’s forecast is that an inflation shock will quickly dissipate, policy should be designed as if the shock will persist.

Determining exactly what policy framework should replace the 2020 one requires care review. It is time to start undertaking that review.

Robert Lucas and the rational expectations revolution

 

Few economists over the past 50 years had as great an impact on macroeconomics as Bob Lucas, who died Monday May 15, 2023 at the age of 85. When Lucas received the 1995 Nobel Prize in Economics, the Prize committee cited him “for having developed and applied the hypothesis of rational expectations, and thereby having transformed macroeconomic analysis and deepened our understanding of economic policy.”

Lucas’s 1972 paper, “Expectations and the neutrality of money,” (Journal of Economic Theory 4(2), 103-124) set out a coherent theory reconciling the long-run neutrality of money with the short-run non-neutrality of money. He did so by carefully modeling an informational friction that generated expectational errors in the short-run, errors that, because individual firms and households formed expectations rationally, could not persist. In his model, only monetary policy surprises mattered for the real economy. This result had profound implications for monetary policy. Lucas and Sargent summarized these implications in 1978, noting that policy had to be systematic, stating that “… [equilibrium methods] will focus attention on the need to think of policy as the choice of stable rules of the game, well understood by economic agents. Only in such a setting will economic theory help predict the actions agents will choose to take.” Yet policy must also be unpredictable: “the government countercyclical policy must itself be unforeseeable by private agents...while at the same time be systematically related to the state of the economy. Effectiveness, then, rests on the inability of private agents to recognize systematic patterns in monetary and fiscal policy (Lucas and Sargent 1978).

When expectations are formed rationally, having policy be systematic while also being unpredictable is a contradiction. Whatever systematic rule the central bank chose to follow would come to be understood by the public and would then make no difference for the real economy; it would matter for inflation, but not for output or unemployment. This conclusion became known as the policy irrelevance hypothesis.

Lucas offered empirical evidence for his theory in “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs.” (American Economic Review, 1973, 63 (3): 326–34). There he showed that evidence on the slope of the output-inflation tradeoff from a cross-section of countries followed “directly from the view that inflation stimulates real output if, and only if, it succeeds in "fooling" suppliers of labor and goods into thinking relative prices are moving in their favor.”

The development of the new Keynesian approach during the 1990s shifted the focus of the non-neutrality of monetary policy from informational frictions to price and wage rigidities. Today’s models are firmly based on rational expectations, relying on nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices and wages as the rationale for the potentially significant but ultimately temporary effects of monetary policy on the real economy.

Importantly, the emphasis today is that policy must be be systematic and predictable if it is to be effective. As described by Woodford in Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy (2003, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), “...the central bank’s stabilization goals can be most effectively achieved only to the extent that the central bank not only acts appropriately, but is also understood by the private sector to predictably act in a certain way. The ability to successfully steer private-sector expectations is favored by a decision procedure that is based on a rule, since in this case the systematic character of the central bank’s actions can be most easily made apparent to the public.” (p. 465, emphasis in original).

While Lucas’s model of monetary non-neutrality has largely been replaced, his impact on current policy discussions is still strong. Discussions of monetary policy, whether in theoretical work or in policy practice, continue to stress the importance of policy credibility and of behaving in a systematic fashion. When central bankers emphasize the important role of inflation expectations, the need to anchor expectations, and that a credible commitment to lower inflation will lessen the unemployment costs of anti-inflation policies, they are channeling the fundamental insights of Bob Lucas.

Wages and inflation

Will faster wage growth lead to higher inflation? Discussions of wage and price spirals are in the news, but by comparing the growth rates of wages and prices, one can lose sight of what is going on with the levels. Real wages – the level of wages relative to the price level – are what matter for those receiving labor income. And what has happened to real wages during the past two years of above target inflation depends very much on which price index one uses to deflate nominal wages.

The Fed’s preferred index for measuring inflation is the personal consumption price index less food and energy prices, called core PCE). The PCE index does a better job of capturing how household substitute away from goods whose prices have risen more than average and away from goods whose prices have risen less than average. The ability to substitute across goods helps to mitigate the effect of inflation on households’ budgets. Eliminating the prices of food and energy, which tend to be volatile, can also give a better picture of future inflation. Using core PCE to deflate the BLS’s series on average hourly earnings yields an estimate of the real wage that is shown in blue in the figure. All data are monthly, seasonally adjusted and obtained from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database; series are normalized to equal 100 in January 2020. The real wage series based on the core PCE price index suggests wages have kept up with inflation. Real wages spiked during the COVID recession and then dropped in its aftermath, but the measure has remained essentially flat since June 2020.

However, core PCE is not the only way to measure inflation. A more common measure of inflation, so common it is sometimes referred to as headline inflation, is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). This index does not do as good a job as the PCE does in incorporating how households shift their spending patterns in response to changing prices. Substituting to cheaper alternatives may cushion the impact of inflation, and this margin of adjustment is better captured by the chain-index PCE inflation measure, but the fact that a household needs to make such a substitution may make the price rise more salient in the household’s assessment of their cost of living. If so, CPI inflation might better capture how households assess the impact of inflation on their living standards. The red line in the figure shows what has happened to the real wage when the CPI is used instead of core PCE. The CPI-based real wage shows a steady decline between June 2020 and June 2022. Since August 2022, the CPI measure of real wages has remained essentially flat at a level approximately 4% below its June 2020 level.

Which measure of real wages might be most relevant for foretelling future wage growth? According to a Gallup Poll (April 6, 2023), inflation remains the top economic concern of Americans in 2023 as it was in 2022, with the fraction of respondents citing inflation as something they worry about “a great deal” coming in at 59% in 2022 and 61% in 2023. The number citing unemployment as something they worry about a great deal was just 32% in both 2022 and 2023.

It seems hard to reconcile how many American are worried about inflation with the stability of the real wage based on the Fed’s preferred price index. The decline in the CPI-based real wage seems much more consistent with the Gallup data. If this is the case, greater pressure for wage growth that is sufficient to boost real wages seems likely.

Bank of Japan IMES Special Trialogue (Part 3)

The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) at the Bank of Japan, to mark its 40^th anniversary, recorded three conversations in October 2022 on central banks, research, and monetary policy in which I participated, together with Athanasios Orphanides (my fellow Honorary Adviser to the IMES) and Deputy Governor Masazumi Watakabe. The third of these conversations, focusing on “An important role of central bank economists for communication”  is now available at https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/en/newsletter/nl202302E1_s3_r.html#t00.

Deputy Governor Watakabe opened the conversation by asking “In what ways do you think central bank research is relevant to or useful for communication purposes?” This is, of course, a key question and goes to the heart of why central banks have research departments.

Athanasios emphasized that a central bank needs to “explain what it is doing and why it is operating in a specific way. But to effectively respond to these public debates, it's very important to have central bank economists who understand academic research and translate that into the language that is understood by the community.”

In my response, I agreed and noted the importance of inflation targeting in facilitating clear communications of policy making by providing an explicit focus, the central bank's inflation objective, around which policy actions can be explained. But I also stressed the importance of not overselling what monetary policy can achieve.

The conversation turned to how central bank economists, through research on their own countries, can help distill and share lessons that as, Athanasios put it, “help identify best practices and build the global regulatory framework.” I noted in this context the important early work on the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates by Japanese economists which subsequently became relevant for a much broader set of countries after the global financial crisis. The experiences with attempting to manage expectations at the ELB and, more recently, with increased rates of rates of inflation, even in Japan, have focused attention on the need to better understand inflation expectations. This is an area where research by IMES economists using survey date from, for example, the Tankan survey of several thousand private firms conducted by the Bank of Japan, are making contributions to an important topic of interest to both central bank and academic researchers.

Athanasios highlighted the impact of demographics on economic growth as another area in which Japan is at the forefront. He suggested that, as was the case with the ELB, research that draws lessons from the Japanese experience is likely to be of increasing relevance to many other countries.

Policymakers at central banks face many challenges in  implementing successful monetary policy . A strong research staff can help policymakers in meeting these challenges by offering new insights into the effects of monetary and regulatory policies, distilling the latest advances from researchers around the world, and accessing how best to communicate policy actions to the public.

Bank of Japan IMES Special Trialogue (Part 2)

 

The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) at the Bank of Japan recorded three conversations on central banks, research, and monetary policy in which I participated, together with Athanasios Orphanides (my fellow Honorary Adviser to the IMES) and Deputy Governor Masazumi Watakabe. 

On February 27th, I posted a link to the first of the three conversations which covered "Interactions between Central Banks and the Academic Community." The second of the three discussions, which focused on "Art and Science in the Conduct of Monetary Policy" is now available at https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/en/newsletter/nl202302E1_s2_r.html

In this conversation, I stressed that "...monetary policymaking must be based on firm science, but in the application, it's not a cookbook process where you just follow the directions..." The global financial crisis, COVID, and the war in Ukraine are examples of situations in which central banks found themselves facing new and unexpected challenges, and I concluded that "The implications of all those things are uncertain at the time and there is no model that would tell you exactly what you should do. In such cases, you need good people with good judgement."

Athanasios pointed out that, while I had started out by talking about science, I ended up by emphasizing judgement. He went on to argue that "...good public policy must be based on solid analytical foundations and measurement." He concluded that "...judgement is required in the situation when there is not enough data nor information to give clear evidence. In that situation, the policymaker by necessity must combine available pieces of information with his or her personal experience and knowledge and come to a good conclusion."

Dealing with uncertainty requires judgement. Deputy Governor Watakabe suggested an "...analogy is between science and technology, rather than between art and science." He noted that just as engineers have to design systems that are robust in the face of uncertainty, economists at central banks must do the same. "Central bank economists are expected to be good engineers." 

From there, our conversation moved on to discuss the role of expectations and the types of data central banks need as they seek to understand the economy and design policies. 

The third conversation in the trialogue deals with "The Role of Central Bank Research in Communications" and will be featured in a future post.

Bank of Japan IMES Special Trialogue

To mark the 40th anniversary of the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) at the Bank of Japan, I participated in a discussion with Athanasios Orphanides (my fellow Honorary Adviser to the IMES), and Deputy Governor Masazumi Wakatabe that touched on three questions: 1) Interactions between central banks and the academic community; 2) Art versus science in the conduct of monetary policy; and 3) The role of central bank research for communications.

The first of these discussions is now available at https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/index.html?lang=en&page=7&id=#07&src=.\en\newsletter\nl202302E1_r.html. In it, Athanasios and I review the evolving relationship between academics and central bank economics, focusing on the U.S. experience. In my comments, I noted how much this relationship has changed since I began my professional career almost 50 years ago. In the 1970 and 80s, standard models stressed that policy surprises were what mattered for the real economy. Any systematic, predictable monetary policy was irrelevant for business cycle behavior. These models were not well posed to offer guidance on how systematic monetary policy could contribute to stabilizing the real economy. That changed with the adoption of the new Keynesian model, which provided a common framework for academic and central bank researchers to contribute to policy-relevant issues.

In his comments, Athanasios stressed that “…research is essential for understanding what has gone wrong in the past. Sometimes it takes decades to understand why some major economic disasters happened and research is what guides us to improve policy.” He used the Great Depression as an example, noting that it took two decades after the publication of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s Monetary History of the United States before it was recognized in the profession as the best explanation and understanding of what had gone wrong with Federal Reserve policy during the Great Depression.

Incidentally, Milton Friedman and James Tobin were the first two Honorary Advisers to the IMES. I stepped down as an Honorary Adviser in December; Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton University took on the role in January. A complete list of all the Honorary Advisers since 1982 can be found at the Institute's web site at https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/en_about.html

Confusing the price level and the inflation rate

Isn't it annoying when the price level and the rate of inflation are confused? Or when bringing down the inflation rate is confused with reducing the price level? See my recent (Feb. 20, 2023) letter in the FT: https://www.ft.com/content/e7fff27b-0c10-47a7-b9a0-d6470b80c68c. (Subscription may be needed.)

In memory of Ben McCallum

Bennett T. McCallum died December 28, 2022. Ben was a major contributor to macro and monetary economics, with important publications spanning 40 years. While his work touched on many topics, his papers on equilibrium determinacy in rational expectations models, monetary policy, interest rate rules, and the importance of robustness in designing policy rules were, I think, his most important. He offered insights into the theoretical implications of general equilibrium monetary models under rational expectations as well as practical guidance to the evaluation of policy rules.

My first interaction with Ben was when he was a discussant of the paper I presented at the 1982 Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium. Far from filling the large meeting room just off the Jackson Lake Lodge's lobby as it does now, in 1982 the whole event was held downstairs in modest room that felt like a basement.

It is interesting to look back at the 1982 Symposium and see what has changed and what has remained the same in terms of the featured topics. On the first day, Alan Blinder presented "Issues in the Coordination of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," and John Taylor presented "The Role of Expectations in the Choice of Monetary Policy," topics still discussed today.  The next day I offered a paper on "The Effects of Alternative Operating Procedures on Economic and Financial Relationships,"  Ed Kane presented "Selecting Monetary Targets in a Changing Financial Environment," and Ben Friedman presented "Using a Credit Aggregate Target to Implement Monetary Policy in the Financial Environment of the Future.” The second day papers reflected the debates of the time over instruments and targets for monetary policy. Nowadays it is taken for granted that central banks employ a short-term interest rate as their policy instrument and that targets should be for goals such as inflation, not for alternative definitions of reserves or monetary aggregates.

In looking back over Ben's discussion of my 1982 paper, I was struck by his concluding comments: "...recommending the use of equilibrium models is not the same as asserting that the behavior of the economy is well-described by flexible-price equilibrium models. As Taylor's (1982) paper for the conference points out, these models are difficult to reconcile with the data. What is needed is an extended equilibrium analysis that explains the existence and nature of nominal contracts and thus predicts how they will respond to changes in policy…The virtue of the equilibrium-analysis program is that it provides a particular form of analytical discipline, i.e., it encourages one to think carefully about the behavior of individual agents and about the way in which the actions of many such agents interact. This discipline is valuable...."

Recall that 1982 was the year Kydland and Prescott published "Time to build and aggregate fluctuations,” (Econometrica, 50:1345-1370), providing the foundation for real business cycle analysis based on equilibrium modeling approaches. Ben stressed that the use of equilibrium models did not preclude introducing nominal rigidities that both facilitated the study of monetary policy rules and helped to fit business cycle data. Since the early 1980s, economists in the new Keynesian tradition have made great strides in extending our understanding of the role of nominal rigidities. However, the profession has been less successful in addressing Ben’s call for explaining the existence of such rigidities.

Here is a very short and selective set of some of Ben’s important papers; the titles give a good sense of some of the topics he worked on:

McCallum, B.T. 1981. “Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and Rational Expectations.”  Journal of Monetary Economics 8:319-329.

McCallum, B T. 1983. “On Non-Uniqueness in Rational Expectations Models: An Attempt at Perspective.” Journal of Monetary Economics 11 (2): 139–68.

McCallum, B.T. 1986. “Some Issues Concerning Interest Rate Pegging, Price Level Determinacy, and the Real Bills Doctrine.” Journal of Monetary Economics 17 (1): 135–60.

McCallum, B.T. 1988. “Robustness Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 29: 173–204.

McCallum, B.T. 1999. “Issues in the Design of Monetary Policy Rules.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics, edited by J Taylor and M Woodford, 1483–1530. Vol. 1C, Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.